The term 'Greece' in this paper follows Arendt's rather vague usage, referring to the Greek citystates of the ancient world broadly, but evidently predominantly drawing from the history of Athens, which she occasionally uses interchangeably with 'Greece.' This not only masks the wide variation between the over 100 city-states of ancient Greece, but tends to glaze over the development of democratic political culture within Athens itself, which changes radically over this period (a development she discusses at times, but which does not prevent her from identifying 'Greece' in the main as a unitary political culture.) 8 Although 'On Violence' was written in the context of a very clear and particular set of violent threats to politics, not least the possibility of nuclear war, the actual description of violence she offers in this essay is quite divorced from the particular threats with which she was concerned.
connect in their shared reliance on discourse: to produce power, and to make action immortal through narrative.
The prioritisation of 'action' understood in terms of an agonal process of discourse between equal citizens, whether understood as the 'drive to show one's self' or the power that emerged through these exchanges of speech, marked out action as the distinctively political activity. In this agonal discourse, Arendt claims, the value of politics was to be found: the creating of intersubjective meaning between citizens. Political action was therefore not endoriented or consequentialist, but rather, the activity held intrinsic value. Yet this excludes two elements generally considered essential to politics: legislation, and violence. Both were understood as acts of 'making,' of exerting dominance over some subject to produce particular outcomes. Thus both were considered incompatible with the essential equality of the political sphere and the intrinsic value of its own practices. War, Arendt writes, is something that happened outside the polis. Legislation, meanwhile, is seen as pre-political, creating the space in which men might then act politically. 'Before men began to act,' she writes, 'a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place, the space being the public realm of the polis and its structure the law.' 23 Yet, she continues, 'the laws, like the walls around the city, were not results of action, but products of making.' 24 Arendt's claim that Athens stands at the beginning of Western politics, and her use of Athens to illustrate fundamental political elements, including action, has led many to equate Arendt's ideal politics with her depiction of the polis. But the 'highly theatrical 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., individualism' of the Greek polis does not define politics for Arendt. 25 There is, alongside comprehend the 'political genius of Rome,' writes Arendt, that is, the Romans' particular idea of legislation and foundation. 29 Rather, the philosophers suggested that men should renounce their capacity for action in favour of greater stability for the political body through fixed, unchanging legislation -a cure worse than the problem, Arendt believed.
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Tsao claims that Roman lex was preferred by Arendt because the Greeks conflated action and 'making' -a non-political activity -in their understanding of legislation as the firmly defined boundary of the political. However, the proper relationship between action and making in politics is far more complex, and I suggest rather that the problem may be summarised in the idea that the Greeks failed to adequately embody the realities of political action within the law.
There are a number of inter-related elements to this claim. First, it is problematic, for
Arendt, that nomos is characterised in terms of boundaries, rather than relationships, as lex was. The polis was pre-defined: before 'action' could be enacted, a supreme legislator was required to define the political space: territorially, legally, and demographically. Within a space thus cleared for politics, citizens could then talk and act in a political manner -politics therefore rested upon the distinctly prepolitical productive activity of the legislator. 'The law is, so to speak, something by which the polis enters its political life, something it cannot abolish.' 31 Greek law therefore ruled over men, rather than being a product of political action, and thus, the 'extraordinary political fruitfulness of the Roman concept of law,' is opposed to Ibid. of action that was lauded in the Greek world -was irrepressible, and this conflict is identified by Arendt as a major factor in the decline of the polis.
The third and final point I wish to highlight here, is that whilst this conflict posed problems, the Greek ideal of 'heroic' action was itself problematic for political stability. In her essay 'Introduction into Politics,' written around the same time as The Human Condition, Arendt explains why. Action, she writes, 'can never occur in isolation, insofar as the person who begins something can embark upon it only after he has won over others to help him.' In this sense, she continues, 'all action is action "in concert"…that is, in the sense of the Greek verb prattein, to carry out and complete.' This is the stage of action which 'ultimately determines how human affairs turn out and how they appear, it is the most politically important stage.' Action in concert is preceded by 'the beginning, the archein [which]
depends on an individual and his courage to embark upon an enterprise.' Thus, Arendt concludes, 'although all freedom would forfeit its best and deepest meaning without this freedom of spontaneity, the latter is itself prepolitical…spontaneity depends on organizational forms of life only to the extent that it is ultimately the world that can organize it.' 37 So, the form of action so highly prized in Greek politics was, although necessary for politics, in reality prepolitical. Yet the founding aim of Greek politics was to raise up this aspect of action, to 'make the extraordinary an everyday occurrence.'
38
What resulted from this conjunction was both the genius and downfall of Athens. The utter boundlessness of the action which drove Athens forward, ultimately pulled it apart from the inside. On one side is the polis as a defined creation of the legislator, on the other, the 37 Arendt, 'Introduction into Politics,' 127-8. 38 Arendt, The Human Condition, 197.
heroic individual continuously attempting to reshape the polis in their own mould -but without a means by which to constitutionally enact the (often much-needed) change. Constant attempts to introduce the new are enacted in opposition to the stability of the state, structured as it is. The missing link is power, that is, action as prattein or carrying through, as opposed to action as archein, or pure initiation, the necessary juncture between (individual) action and legislation. Prattein embodies the action of the group, rather than the prepolitical initiatory action of the individual into the group, and is thus, Arendt remarks, the most politically important form of action. 39 But power is diminished both by Greek heroic action which disempowers the broader mass of the people, and by the constitutional limits of the state conceived as a pre-formed set of boundaries. Pursuing the extraordinary resulted in the remarkable achievements of Greek culture and politics, and their immortality over the millennia. But in political fact it also resulted in the collapse of the polis. The legislatively 'fixed' state was unable to manage the action, conflict, and, ultimately, violence that increasingly infiltrated the political sphere itself as power was eroded.
In making the claim that Arendt understood the polis as a great, but essentially flawed, political entity, I do not suggest that Athens was without importance in her work. Her criticism does not detract from her depiction of the Greek political system as a shining example of pure heroic action in the political sphere, but it does mean such a system is unstable, and unlikely to endure, particularly when conjoined with a rigid legislative framework. Not only did this system fail, moreover, Arendt believed it produced its own antithesis in the work of Plato and his successors, fostering the emergence of an anti-political prioritisation of contemplation. It is worth noting that Arendt herself recognises many of the problems with Athenian politics that her critics have identified with her notion of 'politics.' Yet, as Arendt makes clear, there is nothing natural or necessary about the existence of any particular polity; politics neither emerges, nor exists, 'naturally,' but must be created by men anew, or transmitted by the actions of men over time. Yet if 'making,' or any non-speech action, is excluded from politics, as Arendt claims it is, how can power be maintained? A politics based exclusively on power relies to an unreasonable extent on cooperation, within a system that operates through difference and disagreement, rooted in individual action. It is to
Arendt's work on Rome that we must look for an alternative to a pure action-based politics, and one that incorporates a notion of 'making' that is far more political than is often believed to be the case. The 'making' of the world in this sense occurs primarily through the preservation of past action through the written word, rather than the construction by a law-giver of a future political world. Instead of the creation of the political space being understood as the activity of a legislator projecting forward, fixing legislation and the borders of the political space into the future, the Romans understood the creation of the political space to be an active process of augmenting a sacred foundation. It was political, because it rested on action and power, and durable because it was linked to a particular understanding of the past, and the role of the past in the present. In this way, the continual re-creation and stabilisation of the political 51 Hammer, 'Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought,' 138.
sphere could be enacted. The foundation acted as a limiting institution to counter the agonal, destabilising nature of action, whilst still permitting change and thus a connection to power, the driving force of politics.
For Arendt, the example of Rome shows that politics should be considered as a relationship between structure and action, constructed in such a way that the actions of the political space ought to enable the continual evolution of that space, without destroying it altogether. Without such an understanding of politics, Athens was unable to incorporate political change into the political space itself. In Rome, even the foundation of the city was seen as a continuation of the true beginning, Arendt observes. In the Roman historical narrative, Rome 'was the resurgence of Troy and the reestablishment of some city-state that had existed before and of which the thread of continuity and tradition never had broken.'
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This gave an aspect of stability and continuity to Roman politics which was lacking in the polis, where the stabilising factors of legislation were outside politics, and politics itself was dominated to a greater, and ultimately unsustainable extent, by individualistic action. The past became a part of the living tradition of Roman politics: the 'common sense' of the Republican political sphere nurtured tradition, while tradition bounded the instability of action behind the political shared world. There is something unique about tradition which, unlike institutions of rule, does not deny action, but mitigates its more dangerous aspects, because it contains or limits action, but without enforcing absolute rules. The difference between Greek law or nomos, and Roman law or lex, illustrates the way in which violence plays a very different role in the understanding, and practice, of the political in Greece and Rome. Legislation understood to be outside politics or prepolitical, where it forms the 'wall-like law,' is the specifically Greek notion. 53 Legislative change is not within the remit of the citizens, or indeed any institution of the polis. The Roman understanding of legislation, by contrast, is that it neither forms the whole of politics, nor is strictly prepolitical. The Roman sense of lex corresponds to Montesquieu's 'rapports,' Arendt argues, 'the "rules" or régles which determine the government of a world and without which a world would not exist at all…the relations which exist and preserve different realms of being.' 54 As part of tradition, legislation helps to create the 'world' or political space that enables and stabilises action. Legislation connects with tradition through 'augmentation,' and thus is an act of 'making' in a limited sense. But importantly, this idea of legislation is not 53 Ibid., 64. 54 Arendt, On Revolution, 188.
conceptualised as a boundary around the political space, but is understood in terms of a structure of relationships between people in a political community and so is positioned within politics. In fact, Arendt argues, 'the Roman politicization of the space between peoples marks the beginning of the Western world -indeed, it first created the Western world as world.'
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Unlike nomos, which bound politics to a small, intense field of action, Roman lex opened up the political space to change.
The political benefit of understanding law as a set of malleable relationships, rather than a fixed boundary structure, is most apparent in the Roman ability to expand their political territory through war and treaty making. Roman political expansionismincorporating within it, invariably, the aspect of (often extreme) violence -was simply not a possibility open to the Greeks. While the Athenians could aggrandize themselves through war, winning glory and tribute, they could not incorporate their conquests into their polity as the Romans did. The fixed Greek territorial state, the legislature, and the citizen body, could not change as circumstance demanded. To counter political decline, the Greek philosophers looked to a method of stabilising politics that they understood to be outside politics -in the realm of abstract thought, and its concept of 'the good,' to bring order to chaos -but the Romans reshaped politics itself through their innovative use of legislation as a way of extending politics through post-conflict treaties.
As Patricia Owens writes, Arendt 'condemned the ancient Greeks for building their polis around the ideals of agonistic contest whilst simultaneously excluding all legal and political recognition of the "barbarians" outside…The Romans by contrast, endowed the I do not want to claim that the description of politics, and its relationship with violence, that is offered in Arendt's portrayal of the ancient world is at odds with the rest of her work. Quite the opposite is true: the highly abstracted concepts laid out within 'On Violence' must be understood together with the more complex analysis of politics, as it is practiced in the farfrom-ideal real world, to fully grasp the claims Arendt is making about how politics and violence relate. Of particular importance, in this respect, in Arendt's writings on Rome, and absent if one simply understands her work as an idealisation of Greece, is the insight that politics, although defined by action, is not exclusively action, but also relies upon a human artifice created by men through certain kinds of political fabrication.
Her analysis of Roman politics emphasises the importance of a counterpart to action in politics, understood as tradition and legislation, enacting a continual making and remaking of the political world, including through acts of violence. Any political world is more than intangible 'common sense,' important though that is. Tradition must be embodied within the common sense if it is to influence the actions of the community, by framing which actions are seen to be legitimate according to the founding principles. But it is also part of an institutional and cultural fabricated world. The sustaining of the past in the present, and for the present, must be in part entrenched in a physical world if it is not to suffer the same problems of discontinuity and spontaneous change inherent in action. Physical things are required to 'give the human artifice the stability without which it could never be a reliable home for men,' Arendt states. 'The man-made world of things, the human artifice erected by homo faber, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure and outlast the ever-changing moment of their lives and actions.' Therefore, she continues, acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the artists, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because without them, the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell,
would not survive at all.
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Thus, homo faber, 'in his highest capacity' -through work that involves telling the stories of action -is required for a political entity to transcend any particular time, and sustain itself over longer periods. For Arendt, the writer, poet, historian, monument maker -and, we might add, legislator -are integral to the stabilisation of the human artifice by establishing understanding of the various concepts and categories created through lived experience. This understanding of 'work,' then, connects to her conception of tradition, in at least two important respects. First, the examples Arendt offers of the politically relevant productive aspect of the homo faber are deeply historical: from monument building, to historiography, to poets in the form of heroic storytellers, all are artists who seek to preserve history for the future, framing events as exemplary experiences. Secondly, the manner in which this comes about closely resembles the dual aspect of tradition for Arendt: being both a 'fixing' of action; whilst also relying on its integration with action to maintain its authority.
Within the production of political works, there is a spectrum of types of productive activity, either more or less closely connected to action. Physical art has a relative permanence of character; closer to a utilitarian 'making' than some other forms of cultureproduction. 70 At the other extreme is poetry, in which 'remembrance, Mnēmosynē, the mother of the muses, is directly transformed into memory.' However, she continues, 'of all things of 69 Ibid., 173. 70 Ibid., 168.
embodied within the legislative activity whilst maintaining a sense of tradition, or the sanctity of the past. It is an active engagement with the past in the present, as opposed to the passive involvement of the Greeks in their political submission to the legislator of the past.
The Roman political world is thus comprised of power, action, and, in a limited sense:
'work.' And this latter activity is deeply violent: 'an element of violence is inevitably inherent in all activities of making, fabricating, and producing.' 73 For Arendt, making is a process of construction, but it is also, as a process of change, a kind of destruction. This is where violence is inevitable in the making process. It clears a space for the new by rejecting and destroying the old. Human action, Arendt points out, does not start 'ab ovo, to create ex nihilo. In order to make room for one's own action, something that was there before must be removed or destroyed.' 74 Given that work is, in some sense, a part of the political sphere, a sphere defined by its commitment to action, its relationship to politics requires further America's hegemonic ambitions and heavy-handed actions across the globe over the 1960s and 1970s were a source of deep concern to Arendt. But it is not the case that her attitude to warfare changed as a result of American activities. In the 1950s, she considered the contemporary use of imperial warfare to be unjustifiable, despite her support of imperial elements in Roman warfare in the same period of her work. The differences that appear in her work are, instead, due to the shape of the modern polity and its ideology, not a change in
Arendt's opinions on this, as will be set out over the following paragraphs. By contrast, in the Roman system of politics, where 'making' was combined with an understanding of politics as action, and limited to 'augmentation' of the past, as opposed to a wholly revolutionary remaking of the future, a certain degree of violence was perfectly permissible in political terms, and even necessary. When 'making' supersedes action, politics is lost, and the violence that emerges is without political justification. It is, of course, against this background that Arendt writes so vehemently against violence, in the sense in which it is associated with politics in a post-Marx era, where history and politics is believed to be 'made' by men, that is, when the future is determined in advance, through whatever invariably violent means are necessary. For Arendt, the recovery of action in politics is paramount if we are to reverse this tendency in our politics. Yet, it should not be forgotten that action, as Rome shows, is not the only important aspect of politics, and Arendt's rejection of violence in the modern world, does not equate to the necessary rejection of violence in all political situations, including, potentially, in our political future. Indeed, in order to protect a new political tradition, the Roman example shows that a degree of violence may be considered justifiable and required for political stability. Of course, none of this is possible unless genuine politics is recovered. But violence -some forms of violence -may be a part of that genuinely political framework.
Arendt is not seeking to justify violence in political terms in her analysis of Greece and Rome, but it is implicit in her claims about the politics of these two worlds. The comparison offered here suggests that, instead of drawing a sharp line between violence and politics, in truth there is a justified political connection between violent acts and political acts in Arendt's work. Violence does not explicitly exclude politics but the political sphere must draw on, as its foundation, action and power, if it is to be considered legitimate. Today, it is the case that violence is politically inexcusable for Arendt, but this is not due to technical considerations of the means of violence, but the fact that for Arendt, true politics -the only justifying factor for violence -is absent in the world, and has been replaced by a misconception of violence as politics itself.
